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Reviews
Still Preying on Strategic Reputation
Models of Predation
John R. Lott, Jr.
Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe?
University of Chicago Press 1999

Peter H. Huang

L

ott not surprisingly answers the
questions in the title of his book with
no and him. Since I agreed to write
this review, two scholars, David Sappington
and J. Gregory Sidak, have reviewed Lott’s
book, concluding that although it is provocative and important, it also has many Ôaws.1
They make a number of good criticisms. For
example they point out that Lott surprisingly does not precisely deÕne predatory
pricing before beginning to discuss it.2 Only
later does Lott cite what he states is “the
deÕnition of predation used in industrial
organization” (p. 64). This quotation suggests widespread agreement among econo-

1
2
3
4

mists over just one such deÕnition. But in
reality there are many possible deÕnitions,
including pricing below one’s own or one’s
rivals’ values for each of these variables:
short-run marginal cost, average variable
cost, long-run marginal cost, or average total
cost.3 Furthermore, the particular deÕnition
Lott cites favorably is one that two experimental economists use after concluding that
no universally accepted deÕnition exists. But
this particular deÕnition is restrictive in several respects.4 First, it ignores the possibility
that incumbents and entrants maximize
their proÕts intertemporally rather than myopically. Second, it ignores the possibility that

Peter H. Huang is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Visiting
Professor of Law and Olin Fellow at the University of Southern California Law School.
David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271 (2000).
Id. at 273.
Dennis Carlton & JeÖrey M. PerloÖ, Modern Industrial Organization, 3d ed. 339-42 (2000).
Louis Phlips, Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective 208 (1995).
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predation is consistent with the incumbent’s
price being above the minimum of an
entrant’s average costs. Finally, it ignores the
possibility that an incumbent’s goal might be
to delay not prevent entry.5
Sappington and Sidak also note that Lott
fails to present clearly the assumptions of his
theoretical arguments in the form of careful,
detailed game-theoretic models.6 This failure
is frustrating and ironic in light of a central
insight of asymmetric information game
(AIG) models, namely that predicted behavior is sensitive to assumptions about who
knows what and when. Finally, Sappington
and Sidak observe that Lott’s empirical analysis is not deÕnitive because it suÖers from conceptual and technical Ôaws.7
Lott tries to empirically test whether AIG
models of predatory pricing for the purpose of
developing a “reputation for toughness” describe real world practices. Lott states that
“[i]t is important that the plausibility of key
assumptions underlying these models be
examined and validated before the models are
used for policy purposes” (p. 18). This position diÖers from a standard view in economics
that a model’s empirical validity does not
depend on the plausibility of its assumptions.
As Milton Friedman has argued, it is the accuracy of a model’s predictions, not its assumptions, that provides the ultimate test of a
model.8 But even accepting Lott’s research
strategy, he construes the assumptions of AIG
reputational models of predatory pricing too
literally. He restrictively interprets these mod-

els to require a “crazy” type of monopolist who
does not maximize proÕts and that only such
types engage in predatory pricing. Certainly
one can interpret a “strong” type monopolist
as a Õrm with only a single feasible action,
namely to Õght any entry regardless of
whether that maximizes proÕts. But this is not
the only possible interpretation. Another
interpretation is that a “strong” type actually
has lower production costs than a “weak”
type.9 In other words, both types are rational
in the sense of being proÕt-maximizing. The
diÖerence is just in how costly it is to charge a
low price.
A fundamental problem with Lott’s empirical tests is his belief that Õrms accused or convicted of predatory pricing must diÖer from
other Õrms in the sense of the accused or convicted Õrms being “strong” types. This interpretation of Milgrom and Roberts’ AIG
model is too strong.10 It passes over the complexities of the notion of common knowledge
central to AIG models. Firms can still
proÕtably and credibly engage in predatory
pricing even though all potential entrants
know those Õrms are not “strong.” This review
presents other empirical and experimental evidence supporting AIG predation reputation
models. It also suggests a novel theory of predatory pricing not involving reputation. It discusses Lott’s creative idea that potential
entrants can supplement entry with Õnancial
strategies. It concludes by placing Lott’s book
in a broader context of the past, present, and
future of predatory pricing.

5
6
7
8

David Easley et al., Preying for Time, 33 J. Industrial Org. 445, 447 (1985).
Sappington & Sidak, 276 (cited in note 1).
Id. at 277-81, 286-89.
Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics 3, 16-23
(1953).
9 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Econ. Theory
280, 284 fn.4 (1982); David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J.
Econ. Theory 253, 256 (1982).
10 Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory & Legal Policy, Appendix, Geo. L.J.
(forthcoming 2000), make the same point.
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Lack of Common Knowledge
about Common Knowledge
Lott states: “[m]aking predation strategies
credible (in recent terminology, ‘renegotiationproof ’) requires that Õrms ensure that managers who proceed with costly predatory acts are
not penalized or ousted from oÓce for doing
so” (p. 18). But AIG models of predatory pricing do not require that a monopolist be
“strong” in the sense of entrenching managers
who do not maximize short-term proÕts.11
AIG models of predatory pricing only assume
lack of common knowledge of an incumbent
Õrm’s payoÖs, and that Õrms maximize their
expected proÕts.
The concept of common knowledge is subtle. Something is common knowledge between
A and B if A knows it, B knows it, A knows
that B knows it, B knows that A knows it, and
so forth ad inÕnitum.12 A legendary example
illustrating the complexities of common
knowledge involves two married couples living
on an island with both wives being perfect
logicians.13 Suppose that each wife is having a
secret aÖair with the other’s husband. Each
wife thus knows the other husband is unfaithful, but does not know if her husband is also
unfaithful. Suppose the island norm is that
upon learning that her husband is unfaithful, a
wife must shoot him at dawn the next day.
One day, a priestess visits the island. Just
before she leaves the priestess announces in
front of both wives that she has taken a vow of
honesty and that one of their husbands is
unfaithful. On the surface, this statement provides no new information to either wife

because each knows the other’s husband is
unfaithful. But, neither wife knows that both
wives know that. Thus, neither wife can conclude that she has an unfaithful husband and
so does not shoot her spouse the next morning
(assuming that both wives follow the island
norm). But on the next morning after both
wives do not shoot their husbands, both wives
know that both wives know the other’s husband is unfaithful.
The story generalizes to any Õnite number
of married couples, but is a bit more complicated. PG-rated versions of this example
involve children unsure of whether they have
mud on their foreheads or wise men uncertain of the color of hats placed on them.14
Another example of the power of assuming
common knowledge is the “Groucho Marx”
non-speculation theorem, which concludes
that individuals will not trade with each
other given common knowledge of rationality of players and proposed trades.15 Common knowledge of something is thus a very
strong assumption. Any lack of common
knowledge about a player’s payoÖs can alter
that player’s behavior for the purpose of generating a reputation.
AIGs are the source of comedy and tragedy
in Shakespearean plays and of intrigue in
Sherlock Holmes adventures. In the movie
Casablanca, the character Ferrari remarks that
“He’s a diÓcult customer that Rick, one never
knows what he’ll do or why.” This remark
aptly captures a central feature of AIG models, namely uncertainty over the preferences of
others. A standard assumption of complete
information game theory is that each player’s

11 Carlton & PerloÖ, 338 (cited in note 3).
12 Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 Ann. Stat. 1236 (1976).
13 Yoram Moses et al., Cheating Husbands and Other Stories: A Case Study of Knowledge, Action,
and Communication, 1 Distributed Computing 167, 168-69 (1986).
14 Ronald Fagin et al., Reasoning About Knowledge 3-7 (1995).
15 Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge, 26 J. Econ. Theory 17
(1982) (Groucho Marx reputedly said that he would neither join a club nor date a woman willing to
accept him).
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payoÖ and the rationality of each player are
common knowledge among all of the players.
The distinguishing aspect of AIG models
from complete information game models is
that AIG models do not assume common
knowledge of payoÖs among players.
An appendix in the original MilgromRoberts AIG model of predatory pricing considers an example where an incumbent and
two potential entrants know that incumbent is
“weak” in the sense that its proÕt-maximizing
choice is to accommodate any entry. But if
even one potential entrant is uncertain
whether the incumbent knows that both
potential entrants know the incumbent is
“weak,” then predatory pricing can be a
rational strategy for the incumbent.16 Even
though a “weak” monopolist suÖers costs from
preying, it can recoup those losses in the form
of higher proÕts resulting from deterring
entry. In other words, even if an incumbent
Õrm’s short-run proÕt-maximizing choice is to
accommodate entry, that incumbent may prey
in early periods to develop a reputation for
toughness because of the longer-term beneÕts
from such demonstrations. Such an incumbent mimics how “strong” types behave to
avoid revealing its “weakness.” Upon realizing
this incentive to prey on the part of even
“weak” types, early potential entrants do not
enter from a fear of being preyed upon to scare
away other later potential entrants.
Imitation by “weak” types of “strong”
behavior is memorably captured by the beerquiche breakfast game in which a bully
observes whether a person has beer or quiche
for breakfast before deciding whether to challenge that person to a Õght.17 The bully prefers
to challenge a coward, but not a brave person,
to Õght. Cowards prefer quiche for breakfast,

while brave hearts prefer beer. Both cowards
and brave hearts prefer not to Õght and this
preference outweighs their breakfast preferences. An equilibrium involves the bully not
challenging if he observes beer, the bully challenging if he observes quiche, and both cowards and brave hearts choosing beer for
breakfast.
It is worth explaining the details of the Milgrom and Roberts example that lack of common knowledge can generate preying. An
established monopolist M faces potential
entrant E1 followed sequentially by potential
entrant E2. Three possible states of the
world – A, B, and C – are equally likely, and in
all three states, entrants get a payoÖ of zero if
they enter and M preys.
In state A, for each market, any entry is met
by predation because M is “strong” in the
sense that predation dominates accommodating entry.
In states B and C, M is “weak” and may
either prey or share the market. In state B, M’s
weakness is caused by production costs that
diÖer from those in state A. In state C, M’s
weakness is caused by market demand that
diÖers from that in state A. As depicted in
Figure 1, if a potential entrant stays out, it
receives 1.5 and M receives 10.0; if it enters and
M preys, the entrant receives 0.0 and M

Figure 1: (E’s payoÖ, M’s payoÖ).
Potential Entrant
stay out

enter

(1.5, 10.0)

Incumbent
share

prey

(2.5, 2.5)

(0.0, -1.0)

16 Milgrom & Roberts, appendix B, 306-07 (cited in note 9); Kreps & Wilson, 256 (cited in note 9);
Phlips, 192-93 (cited in note 4).
17 Ken Binmore, Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory 504-09 (1992); David Kreps, A Course in
Microeconomic Theory 463-67, 498-99 (1990).
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receives -1.0; and if it enters and M shares,
both Õrms receive 2.5.
M, E1, and E2 do not, however, share common knowledge about states A, B, and C:
E1 knows exactly which of the three states
obtains.
But E2 cannot distinguish between A and B.
Finally, M cannot distinguish between B and
C, meaning that M knows whether it is
“strong” (A) or not (B and C), but if M is not
“strong,” it does not know why (changed costs
or changed demand).

Symbolically, the information partition structure can be represented thus, M: [{A}, {B, C}],
E1: [{A}, {B}, {C}], and E2: [{A, B}, {C}].
Because M cannot distinguish between B
and C, M must choose the same action for
both states. If M shares with E1, M’s payoÖ is
2.5 in the Õrst market. If state C exists, E2
knows this and enters (recall that E2 can distinguish between B and C), M shares again
and M’s payoÖ is also 2.5 in the second market.
If M shares with E1 and state B occurs, M’s
failure to prey against E1 allows E2 to infer the
existence of state B (recall that E2 cannot distinguish A from B, but once E1 knows that M
did not prey, it knows that A cannot exist).
This means that E2 should enter because M
will share. Thus, M’s payoÖ is 2.5 in the second
market as well. Thus, by not preying against
E1, M’s total payoÖ is 2.5 + 2.5 = 5.0.
On the other hand, if M preys in both B
and C, it receives -1 in the Õrst market. If C
occurs, E2 knows this and so enters because it
does not fear M. Thus, M receives 2.5 in the
second market for a total payoÖ of 1.5. But if B
occurs, E2 cannot distinguish between A
(“strong” M) and B (“weak” M). By preying on
E1 in the Õrst market M does not reveal to E2
that B obtains. Thus, E2 has to determine its
payoÖs in both A and B to calculate its
expected payoÖ. If E2 enters in A, M preys and
E2 receives 0.0, while if E2 enters in B, M
shares and E2 receives 2.5. Because E2 views A

and B as equally likely, E2’s expected payoÖ to
entering is ½(0.0) + ½(2.5) = 1.25. By
assumption, if E2 stays out, its payoÖ is 1.5.
Thus, E2 stays out if B occurs and M receives a
payoÖ of 10.0 in the second market for a total
payoÖ of -1.0 + 10.0 = 9.0.
Because M views states B and C as equally
likely, M believes that preying is equally likely
to result in E2 entering or staying out. Therefore, M’s expected total payoÖ from preying
despite its weakness in B and C is ½(1.5) +
½(9.0) = 5.25. Remember, if M does not prey,
its payoÖ is 5.0. Thus, M preys irrespective of
whether B or C obtains. By assumption, M
also preys if A obtains. So regardless of the
actual state, M preys upon E1. Thus, E1 will
never enter because M always preys. So predatory pricing occurs even if C obtains when it is
common knowledge between M and E1 that
M is not “strong.”
In fact when C occurs, it is also common
knowledge between both potential entrants
that M is not “strong.” Nevertheless, M’s
threat of predation against E1 credibly deters
E1 from entering because it is not common
knowledge between M and E2 that M is not
“strong.” To see this, remember that M’s optimal strategy is to prey if E1 enters, regardless
of the state. Because E1 can deduce the above
optimal strategy for M, E1 stays out. Because
E2 cannot distinguish between A and B, E2
only enters if C realizes or if E1 entered and M
failed to prey. If E2 enters, M preys by assumption if A realizes and shares if B or C realizes
because that is the last stage.
This example implies that “weak” types
may prey to pretend to be “strong” because
such masquerading does pay. This behavior
does not require that “weak” types entrench
managers that have a preference for goals
other than proÕt maximization. Thus, Lott’s
Õndings that Õrms accused or convicted of
predatory pricing did not entrench managers
more than other Õrms and his observations
about managerial compensation patterns are
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consistent with AIG reputation models.
Chapter 2 of Lott’s book tests only a particular type of AIG model involving managerial
preference for preying. Preying to build a reputation for “toughness” when there is lack of
common knowledge that an incumbent is
“weak” is only one of many possible AIG
rationales for preying. An example of preying
that does not involve developing a reputation
is preying to confuse a competitor or for “signal jamming.”18 The purpose of such preying
is to interfere with a potential entrant’s eÖorts
to calculate its future proÕts, that is, to
obscure rather than generate information.

Other Empirical s
Experimental Evidence
Lott provides a critical survey of some of the
existing evidence that private Õrms engage in
predatory pricing (p. 4-10). But he does not
address other empirical studies that support
reputational models of predatory behavior
other than pricing decisions. For example, a
study of location decisions by supermarket
chains in Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta,
Canada concluded that the data is consistent
with the dominant chain spatially preying on
new entrants by opening up new stores near
them.19 This empirical study found evidence
of a reputation period followed by a predatory
period, with market shares of those that had
been preyed upon continuing to fall, and not
much new entry occurring despite rapid
growth in the industry overall.20 Finally, evi-

dence suggests that the dominant chain preferred to wait for new entry before it opened a
new store to emphasize the predatory nature
of its actions.21
Lott also does not address studies providing evidence of predatory pricing to create reputations that deter entry in experimental tests
of an eight period chain-store game.22 An
experimental version of the Kreps-Wilson
AIG model with both “strong” and “weak”
monopolists and experienced subjects accurately predicted early periods of play in which
predatory pricing occurs 100% of the time and
rates of entry approach 0%. The respective
numbers are 85% and 30% when there are no
experimenter-induced “strong” types. In addition, predatory pricing occurs much sooner in
the latter games than former ones, suggesting
that “weak” monopolists are imitating the
behavior of “strong” monopolists. These Õndings prove that predatory pricing occurs and
pays oÖ in certain laboratory contexts. Thus,
this experimental data contradicts – or at least
undermines – the viewpoint that predatory
pricing allegations must involve economically
irrational behavior.

A Real Options View of
Predatory Pricing
A deÕnition of predatory pricing as pricing
that is not proÕt-maximizing for a single
period makes it clear that there are many similarities between engaging in predatory pricing
and Õling a negative expected value (NEV)

18 Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, A Signal-Jamming Theory of Predation, 17 Rand J. Econ. 366
(1986).
19 Balder Von Hohenbalken & Douglas S. West, Predation Among Supermarkets: An Algorithmic
Locational Analysis, 15 J. Urban Econ. 244 (1984); Douglas S. West & Balder Van Hohenbalken,
Spatial Predation in a Canadian Retail Oligopoly, 24 J. Regional Sci. 415 (1984).
20 Balder Von Hohenbalken & Douglas S. West, Empirical Tests for Predatory Reputation, 19
Canadian J. Econ. 160 (1986).
21 Douglas S. West, Testing for Market Preemption Using Sequential Location Data, 12 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 129 (1981).
22 Yun Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation
and Entry in the Chain-Store Game, 25 Rand J. Econ. 72 (1994).
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lawsuit. Both phenomena are often deemed
individually economically irrational and therefore not of concern to lawmakers and public
policy analysts. Yet both phenomena seem
nonetheless to occur. A recent model of NEV
lawsuits explains how divisibility of litigation
costs over time can make such lawsuits credible.23 Additionally, NEV lawsuits may have
positive options value because of the opportunity to learn information over time.24 This
options approach to litigation generates
insights that are often diÖerent from those
implied by traditional expected value models
of litigation. For example, an options approach
to civil rights litigation suggests that risk multipliers for attorney’s fees should be smaller
than those calculated when litigation is evaluated by its expected value.25
Similarly, predatory pricing can be thought
of as involving a sequence of continuation
options (or alternatively as options to stop the
practice unilaterally or to bilaterally suppress
competition by peaceful coexistence or merger). There are two possible types of relevant
uncertainty in the case of predatory pricing,
namely: endogenously chosen prices and outputs, and exogenously distributed own and
rival (marginal) cost parameters and individual Õrm or market demand conditions.
Another approach is to develop a real options
model of predatory pricing.
This options perspective implies qualitative
comparative static results on the incentives to
engage in predatory pricing. Predatory pricing
may in a given situation have suÓciently posi-

tive option value (just as NEV lawsuits do)
because of the opportunity to learn about cost
or demand conditions and the option to continue predation in light of such learning.
Thus, predation can be like an R&D investment.

Financial s Investment
Strategies Complementary to
Attempted Entry
Chapter 5 of Lott’s book creatively applies to
entry decisions a famous observation made by
Hirshleifer about how inventors can proÕt
from their inventions by trading in securities
markets.26 The idea is that potential entrants
can proÕt from predatory pricing by shorting
an incumbent’s stock or buying puts on the
incumbent’s stock (p. 99). Lott oÖers colorful
and fascinating descriptions of this idea in
action in the business decisions of the “robber
baron” Jay Gould (p. 101-05).27 Lott also speculates that this trading strategy might have
been employed in cases involving competition
between Eastman Kodak and Polaroid, competition between Dole Food and Chiquita,
CBS news reporting about G.D. Searle & Co.,
and interest rate forecasting at Salomon
Brothers (p. 96-98, 105-06, 151-52). As Lott
admits, implementing such Õnancial investment strategies may entail residual risk from
not being suÓciently hedged if there are factors other than entry that aÖect the value of
the incumbent’s stock. Moreover, shorting the
incumbent’s stock is usually feasible only when

23 Lucian Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility of and Success of Threats to Sue, 25
J. Legal Stud. 1 (1996).
24 Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, Real Options and the Economic Analysis of Litigation: A
Preliminary Inquiry, Working Paper No. 131, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Stanford Law School (1996).
25 Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s Fees in Federal Civil
Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1943 (1998).
26 Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity,
61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1971).
27 See also Edward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Street: Speculative Comments
at the End of the Century, 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (forthcoming, 2000).
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the incumbent is a publicly traded corporation. Finally, the marketing and trading
departments of potential entrants may have
diÖerent incentives, information, objectives,
and subcultures that would make such coordinated behavior in product and securities markets diÓcult. But Lott is certainly right about
the generality of Hirshleifer’s insight about
pecuniary externalities (p. 100).

Why All the Fuss over
Predatory Pricing?
It is helpful to place Lott’s book in the larger
context of past and possible future debates
about predatory pricing. The subject of predation has a long and contested history in the
Õelds of antitrust law and industrial organization economics. Predation in high-technology
industries is likely to become more controversial in the future because there is reason to fear
that allegations of predatory innovation might
chill R&D in these industries.28 In the current
case against Microsoft, the Justice Department alleged (among other things) that
Microsoft had engaged in predatory bundling
to leverage its monopoly power in the desktop
applications market to the browser market. It
is certainly possible that government attempts
to prevent predatory pricing may also prevent
behavior that can beneÕt consumers, such as
pro-competitive price-cutting and product
quality improvements.
There is a vast legal and economics literature about whether predatory pricing should
concern regulators and other policy makers.29
On the one hand, the so-called Chicago
School believes that predatory pricing deÕned

as below own marginal cost pricing is not
rational because losses are certain and in the
present, while proÕts are uncertain and in the
future. On the other hand, a modern school
believes that predatory pricing can be a
rational strategy for a monopolist with private
information facing multiple potential entrants.
The Chicago School view was a reaction
to popular business folklore that “robber barons” rose to prominence by engaging in predatory pricing. John D. Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil allegedly cut its prices to below cost with
the intent of driving out smaller competitors
and then subsequently raised its prices,
thereby harming consumers.30 But McGee
found only weak evidence of such behavior
in court records of the Standard Oil case, suggesting that predatory pricing is an empirically unimportant phenomenon.31 He also
made several theoretical arguments why predatory pricing should be an unproÕtable strategy and therefore rarely taken and, hence,
rarely observed. Crucial among these is that
predatory pricing hurts the predator and so
is not a credible threat. The implications of
this view are that making predatory pricing
illegal addresses a problem that does not
exist, discourages lowering prices or improving quality in the face of cost savings or
increased eÓciency, reduces incentives for
achieving such savings or eÓciencies, and
may even facilitate collusion.
The modern view originated in a pair of
models developed by Stanford’s famous “gang
of four” economists.32 Both models resolved
the chain-store paradox, in which an incumbent facing a Õnite number of potential
entrants over a Õnite time horizon has no

28 Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, Losers, & Microsoft: Competition and
Antitrust in High Technology (1999).
29 Steven C. Salop (ed.), Introduction to Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis 1, 9-22 (1981).
30 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
31 John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958).
32 The four economists are David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. Milgrom is
in Stanford’s economics department, while the other three are in its graduate school of business.
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incentive to prey in the last period of the
game and thus in the penultimate period and
so forth.33 A large literature now exists building on the gang-of-four’s pathbreaking models.34 The antitrust policy implications of
this AIG school are that predatory pricing is
a real possibility for monopolists in markets
where potential entrants are not perfectly certain about market costs, market demand, or
information that others have about such cost
and demand conditions.
Nonetheless, despite the real possibility of
predation, the diÓculty of detecting such
behavior and crafting appropriate liability
standards and remedies might exceed the
capabilities of informationally challenged regulators.35 Traditional legal standards of predatory pricing can be under-inclusive because
rivals can be dissuaded from entry without an
incumbent pricing below its current marginal
cost.36 Such standards can also be overinclusive because a monopolist not worrying
about competitors but in an industry with
strong learning eÖects or network externalities
may pro-competitively price below its current

marginal cost.37 A new AIG-based proposed
approach is a structured rule of reason that
includes a fully speciÕed eÓciencies defense.38
Lamentably, Supreme Court and other
appellate court skepticism towards predatory
pricing has not as yet incorporated the lessons
of AIG models.39 One reason that the appellate courts have not been receptive to predatory pricing cases might be that many current
federal appellate judges are Reagan appointees
who believe in a brand of laissez-fare economics that is hostile to the implications of AIG
models. Also, AIG models might not apply to
recently brought cases of predatory pricing.
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that
AIG models of predatory pricing can and will
eventually be accepted by the courts.40
AIG models are increasingly employed in
law and economics.41 But AIG theory’s entry
into areas traditionally dominated by neoclassical price theory has met with resistance.
While Lott’s book responds to speciÕc AIG
reputational models of predatory pricing, it is
written as an aggressive response to AIG models in general.42 Lott views the ascendancy of

33 Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 Theory & Decision 127 (1978).
34 E.g., Jean-Pierre Benoit, Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information, 15
Rand J. Econ. 490 (1984); Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 Rand
J. Econ. 165 (1987). For surveys of this literature see Paul Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, in 3 The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 937 (1987); Robert Wilson, Strategic Models of Entry
Deterrence, in 1 Handbook of Game Theory 305, 320 (Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, eds., 1992).
35 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in Industrial Structure in the
New Industrial Economics 112, 134 (Giacomo Bonnanno & Dario Brandolini, eds., 1990).
36 Id. at 133.
37 Id.
38 Bolton et al. (cited in note 10).
39 Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 226 (1993).
40 Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 Antitrust
L.J. 585 (1994); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr, & Michael T. Mumford, Does Predatory Pricing Exist?
Economic Theory and the Courts After Brooke Group, 41 Antitrust Bull. 949 (1996).
41 Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 159-87 (1994); Peter H. Huang, Strategic
Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal Scholars to Game Theory and the Law by Douglas G.
Baird et al. and Other Game Theory Texts, 36 Jurimetrics J.L. Sci. & Tech. 99, 104-06 (1995).
42 For a discussion of non-AIG models of reputation with applications to human resource
management, see generally James N. Baron & David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources:
Frameworks for General Managers 555-59 (1999).
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Peter H. Huang
AIG models into the subject of predatory pricing as an unfortunate development (p. 119-20).
Unfortunately, he empirically tested just one
very speciÕc and restrictive AIG model from a
large family of possible AIG models. His conclusions are therefore too strong and too hasty.
In summary, more sensible and cautious
answers to the two questions in the title of
Lott’s book are sometimes and modern eco-
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nomic theory. Modern economic theory does
not conclude that predatory pricing is always
credible, but rather highlights structural environments where it might be. Instead of adopting the position that predatory pricing is never
credible and should not be regulated, a more
balanced and useful position is that it sometimes can happen and sometimes might
justiÕably be regulated. B

3 Green Bag 2d 437

